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This paper provides a non-technical overview of the economic arguments related to the desirability
of transfer taxation and a summary of empirical evidence surrounding these issues. Understanding
optimal transfer taxation throughout the distribution requires understanding the nature of a bequest
motive, a topic on which there is little consensus. However, I argue that progress still can be made
on the question of desirability and optimal level of estate taxation at the top of the distribution, because
interpersonal externalities implied by the presence of bequest motive are irrelevant from the welfare
point of view when the focus is on the wealthy. I also examine the role of negative externalities from
wealth concentration in providing justification for considering this type of taxation.
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wk2110@columbia.eduThe U.S. estate tax is in ux at the moment: it was repealed on January 1st, 2010
and is scheduled to come back in its form from 10 years ago in 2011. Hence, even inaction
on the issue (something that eectively and amazingly has happened leading to this point)
corresponds to major policy uctuations in the near future. My objective here is to critically
discuss economic arguments for and against taxation of transfers and empirical evidence
about behavioral consequences of such taxes. My goal is not too ambitious: I am not going
to advance any specic proposals but rather I will describe what I believe is our state of
knowledge on this topic and what should be the key facts taken into account by policy makers
when debating (if it ever happens) the future of this type of taxation.
My major points are as follows. First, disappointingly, general theoretical conclusions
regarding estate taxation hinge on the nature of a bequest motive (the reason why we observe
bequests in the rst place) and there is little consensus about that. As a result, no broad
theoretical conclusions regarding appropriate shape or even sign of marginal estate tax rates
across the wealth distribution can be reached. However, there is hope that a more narrow
question about appropriate taxation at the top of the distribution could be answered without
taking a stand about the nature of bequest motive (though it has not been answered yet).
Second, ignoring traditional redistributional considerations, I briey examine externalities
from wealth concentration as a potential justication for estate taxation. Third, eciency
eects of estate taxation exist and are possibly non-trivial, but are likely to have implications
for the level of the estate tax rates and for how it is administered, rather than for its overall
appeal. This is because the bulk of response appears to be along the avoidance margin rather
than the wealth accumulation margin. As a result, arguments that rely on non-desirability
of capital taxation are not necessarily applicable in this context (and are not bullet-proof
anyway), and one is left with the trade-o between (arguably non-innite) excess burden
and potential benets from estate taxation (such as its revenue capacity, redistributional
role or correction of externalities).
1 Bequest motives
While there are usually many parties that are either directly or indirectly aected by any
particular tax, this is particularly starkly visible in the context of transfer taxation. There
are two sides to every bequest: donor's and donee's. The action of the donor (the choice
2of bequest) directly aects welfare of the donee. Because bequests are usually not bought
and sold (although more on it below), there is a possible externality here: the same dollar
of bequest delivers utility to both the donor and the donee, but that eect need not be
fully internalized when the transfer is decided upon. In other words, when a gift is made
both the donor and the donee benet, but the decision of the donor is driven by his/her
own preferences and, without well-functioning price mechanism in place, need not take full
account of benets enjoyed by the donee.
Presence of an externality has important implications for economic analysis of ecient
policies because it is well-known that optimal policy involves correcting externalities. We
know reasonably well how the presence of a simple externality aects the structure of opti-
mal policy (Sandmo, 1975; Kopczuk, 2003a; Micheletto, 2008) when the externality can be
targeted directly: it does so by modifying the formula for the tax imposed on the source of
externality alone. This is analogous to the Pigouvian correction in a simple rst-best context
of being concerned with externalities alone, but the logic generalizes to second-best contexts
where other taxes are used.1 In other words, as long as we can tax bequests and its bequests
that generate the externality, this is what we want to do.2
At this point, I am considering an externality that actions of a donor (say, a parent)
exert on a donee (say, a child). This issue is conceptually separate from redistributional
considerations (that I will devote attention to later). This is a natural thing to consider in
a typical economic model where the focus is on analyzing ecient policies. There are two
parties involved and one way or another we care about welfare of both them, hence we should
be interested in the extent to which transfers between them are not ecient. Nevertheless,
a bit of introspection suggests that such an interpersonal externality is unlikely to be of the
foremost importance in analyzing practical reforms of a tax that applies to a relatively small
number of wealthy individuals: the correction of an interpersonal externality in that context
amounts to policy makers worrying about whether there are too much or too little transfers
between wealthy parents and wealthy children. While strictly speaking this is a valid issue,
1The remaining modication in the second-best context has to do with the fact that correction of exter-
nality collects revenue and hence requires adjusting all taxes accordingly.
2There is also the question of the level of corrective taxation of externality when one is not in the rst-
best situation. While the literature usually focuses on formulations of the optimal tax rate that accounts for
the marginal cost of raising revenue, Kaplow (2006b) shows that in the presence of optimal nonlinear tax
and weak separability of preferences between leisure and other consumption goods, the optimal correction
reduces to the rst-best Pigouvian rate.
3it is not of a large consequence for the overall welfare because any welfare improvements are
occurring among small number of people whose welfare should be weighted lightly in any
standard welfarist approach.3 Hence, the presence of even a small cost of addressing this
externality may be sucient to eliminate the desire to correct it, the point to which I return
later. Interpersonal externalities should not be ignored in a debate about transfers, but
their relevance in my view is potentially important only when we are considering transfers
throughout the distribution rather than transfers at the top of the distribution as is the case
in the context of the present-day transfer taxation in the United States.
With this caveat in mind, I provide a brief summary of theories about bequest motives
and their consequences for thinking about eciency of transfers.
1.1 Altruism
Bequests may be altruistically motivated, that is donors may be directly interested in in-
creasing welfare of donees, while respecting their preferences. The social planner likely cares
about welfare of both donors and donees. One possibility is to respect donors' preferences
that already put a positive weight on welfare of donees. In that case, there need not be an
interpersonal externality present: donors already account for the full impact of their deci-
sions on donees in the same way that the planner would. Alternatively, we may want to
consider \double-counting" of welfare of donees: gifts to them benet both the donors and
the donees so that, in a way, it's a public good.4 Putting a positive extra weight on the donee
implies that donors no longer account for the full welfare consequences of their decisions:
they recognize their own benet from child's welfare increase but not the extra benet from
counting donee's welfare separately. Hence, now, we are in the world with an interpersonal
externality present. The more sophisticated analysis of these issues requires further consid-
ering the implications for the distribution of wealth and consequences of uncertainty. Recent
3Critically, the argument of Kaplow (2006b) does not apply directly in this case: the correction of
externality usually should not be set at the rst-best level nor is its correction related to the rst-best
intuition. This is because the interpersonal bequest externality is not of an atmospheric type and instead is
associated with particular family lines who are weighted dierently by the social planner due to dierences
in the level of welfare. In the extreme, the correction of externality that accrues from gifts between wealthy
parents and wealthy children with negligible welfare weights (e.g., in the Rawlsian case) has no social value
but requires adjusting tax structure from the otherwise optimal one.
4There has also been work on so-called two-sided altruism under which children care about welfare of
their parents as well. See Laitner (1997) for a discussion.
4work by Farhi and Werning (2007) points out that unless some extra weight is put on welfare
of donees, ecient policies have an unattractive feature of leading to an extreme concentra-
tion of wealth in the long-run.5 Hence, the unrealistic policy prescription arising from their
work may be interpreted as an argument in favor of explicitly recognizing the interpersonal
altruistic externality. Farhi and Werning (2008) analyze optimal tax policy in this context
and nd that bequests should be subsidized, with the marginal subsidy decreasing as the
size of the transfer increases (so that it is in a peculiar way \redistributive").
Is altruism a reasonable theory of bequests? At the very least, we know that it is not the
full theory of bequests: tests of its economic implications are routinely rejected. The best
well-known example of such a test is based on the observation that altruistic bequests should
be compensatory: a parent with two children should make bigger transfers to a child who is
worse o. Yet, in practice, bequests are predominantly split equally between children. Some
support for the desire for compensating children is provided by work of McGarry (1999) who
nds evidence suggesting that inter vivos gifts may be compensatory even though bequests
are not, and by Light and McGarry (2004) show that a fair number of individuals show
intention of behaving in a compensatory manner. Bernheim and Severinov (2003) propose
that bequests may serve as a signal of parental altruism and show that in that context equal
splitting may arise.
Tests of other implications are similarly mixed. Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko (1997)
test and reject another aspect of compensatory nature of altruism: a shift of resources from
a parent to a child should result in a compensating decline in bequests but it does not.
Hurd (1987, 1989) nds little dierence in saving behavior between people with and without
children, which he interprets as the lack of bequest motive, while Laitner and Juster (1996)
and Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) similarly nd little dierence in bequest behavior depending
on having own children, but they still do nd evidence of operative (though not necessarily
altruistic) bequest motive. In either case, the idea that bequeathing can be explained purely
by altruism toward children does not appear to be upheld by the data, instead pointing to
heterogeneity in bequest motives that is not purely driven by having children. Finally, from
a more theoretical point of view, De Nardi (2004) persuasively argued that altruism is not
able to generate thick upper tail of distribution of wealth observed in practice.
5\Extreme" means here that as time goes by wealth gets concentrated among fewer and fewer individuals
with the rest converging to the extreme poverty.
5Overall, altruism does not appear to be able to explain observed patterns of bequests,
although some support for it may be found. It should also be pointed out that from the
point of view of the optimal policy, altruistic preferences introduce a reason to subsidize
rather than tax transfers and hence do not provide an argument for estate taxation that is
observed in practice.
1.2 Exchange
The prominent alternative to altruistic motive are exchange-motivated or strategic bequests.
The idea, articulated by Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985), is that bequests are a
payment for services that the donee delivers to the donor. Many models of that kind can be
constructed, with various strategic considerations coming into play (see Laitner, 1997, for
a general review). Market power in the relationship can rest with the parent who is then
able to extract the surplus from the relationship or it may belong to the child. Dynamic
considerations where a parent cannot commit not to help a child in the future, thereby
inviting inecient behavior are also possible.
Evidence for this kind of a motive is mixed. From the normative point of view, as often
when market power is present, the resulting level of bequests and the allocation do not have
to be ecient so that there may be a reason for taxing or subsidizing depending on the
details of the model. More importantly though, it seems again unlikely that the strategic
motive could explain large bequests (see for example Carroll, 2000) and hence it appears
that focusing on this kind of motivation alone cannot be relied in the analysis of the estate
tax applying to the wealthy.
1.3 Joy-of giving
Another possible reason for leaving a bequest is the so-called \warm-glow" or \joy of giving"
motive (Andreoni, 1990). The idea there is that it is the act of giving itself that provides
benets to the donor. In contrast to altruism, benets to the donee from receiving bequests
are not valued by the donor.6 The joy-of-giving model has two versions: in the \standard"
6It had been argued that altruism and joy-of-giving are observationally equivalent (Abel and Warshawsky,
1988), that is altruistic preferences can be expressed as joy-of-giving and vice versa. However, the argument
breaks down in the presence of the estate tax: the constructed \equivalent" preferences change when the
6one, it is the net value of bequest that matters; alternatively it may be the gross value that
matters, the main source of the dierence in practice being tax liability. I will discuss the
latter variant a bit later, just noting at this point that the two variants could be in principle
distinguished by investigating whether bequests are sensitive to tax considerations.
Joy-of-giving turned out to be a useful way of describing behavior and is often used in
practice as a positive model of bequests. Taken seriously for normative purposes, it again
leads to arguments for subsidizing rather than taxing bequests, because benets from giving
to the donee are not internalized by the donor. However, joy-of-giving leads to a paradoxical
prediction that encouraging gifts that are then returned to the original donor again as gifts
is valuable because it is the act of giving that matters (see Diamond, 2006, for an analysis
of optimal policy with these kinds of preferences in the context of charitable giving) rather
than the ultimate ownership. In my view this highlights that this is a purely positive rather
than normative theory: while it may be a useful way of describing behavior, paradoxical
implications of this theory highlight that it is not an appealing approach for thinking about
welfare.
1.4 Accidental bequests
A prominent theory of bequests is that they are a by-product of saving for other reasons
(such as retirement or health-related expenditures). Individuals who are planning to nance
their retirement out of their own wealth (rather than pensions or annuities) will usually
die with some amount of wealth unspent that will then constitute a bequests. Bequests of
this kind would occur even if the donor derives no benet from bequeathing, simply as an
\accident" due to (premature) death. There is a strand of economic literature that attempts
to explain saving and bequests through this kind of argument, without appealing to a bequest
motive (Hurd, 1989; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995; Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun,
2006). While this turned out to be a very useful approach for analyzing issues related to
saving behavior of general population, it is unlikely to explain the very top of the wealth
distribution. In fact, even augmenting this approach by altruism cannot explain the top of
the distribution (De Nardi, 2004). Hence, relevance of this approach for thinking about the
estate tax is probably limited.
estate tax changes.
7This is not to say that precautionary or retirement saving motives do not play a role at
the top of the distribution, but the point is simply that they are unlikely to be the full or
even the most important aspect of the story. Appealing to accidental bequests is sometimes
used to argue that estate taxation is not distortionary because donors are not aected by
the tax. While this is true from the individual point of view, it does not follow that a
conscatory tax is optimal. Kopczuk (2003b) points out that accidental bequests of this
kind arise only if individuals do not have access to well-functioning annuity markets, that
is if there is some kind of market failure present. In that case though, the optimal policy
response is not necessarily to take advantage of the market failure but rather to address its
source (and potentially eliminate accidental bequests altogether). Even if bequests were to
be conscated, the optimal policy would likely involve transfers or tax breaks that would
mimic annuities instead and hence limiting the argument to implications for the estate tax
is misleading.
1.5 \Capitalistic spirit" motive
The idea here is that wealth itself provides benets to the individual: for example, it can
be a measure of success or the goal in itself. In the simplest form, it is very similar to the
joy-of-giving motive with the caveat that estate taxes should not have an eect on behavior.
As in other cases, there is an externality from giving. Similarly to accidental bequests, taxes
would not distort decisions but contrary to that case this has nothing to do with underlying
ineciency and hence the case for high tax rates is stronger. Nevertheless, the notion that
individuals care about wealth alone should be viewed as a positive rather than normative
approach. For example, an individual may be attached to a business that he built, and this
eect may be well proxied for using the value of a business. Even if the owner does not
care about bequests as such, it does not necessarily follow that policies that would aect
survival of the business after death of the founder are of no interest to him. It has been
argued that this kind of motive is the best candidate for modeling large bequests Carroll
(2000), but normative consequences have not been yet worked out. The nding of Kopczuk
(2007) that wealth continues to increase with age among the elderly wealthy is consistent
with this motive. It is also consistent with another nding in the same paper that much
of estate planning happens following the onset of terminal illness, suggesting the desire for
holding on to wealth prior to the time when death becomes inevitable.
81.6 Inertia and other psychological explanation
Another possibility is that bequests are the result of psychological biases (this argument has
been advocated by Fennell, 2003), such as diculty planning, not understanding the risk,
or denying the possibility of dying (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2005). The nding of a urry of
estate planning activity following the onset of a terminal illness mentioned before (Kopczuk,
2007) could be consistent with underestimating mortality risk until death becomes inevitable.
There is no consensus yet how one should go about welfare economics when people make
\mistakes"(Bernheim and Rangel, 2005), and hence no clear policy implications that were
derived from this kind of evidence. Nevertheless, this is certainly an interesting area for
further exploration, in particular one might expect that if people deviate from economic
rationality in some contexts, situations involving considering own demise are likely to be in
that category.
1.7 Combination of motives
As the discussion above suggests, there is no consensus about the nature (and, in fact, even
about the presence) of a bequest motive. Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2002), among others,
suggested that a combination of motives, including precautionary (or accidental) and another
explicit motivation is required to make sense of the data. The unresolved diculty is what
the intentional piece should look like.
As the discussion above indicates, there are various theories of bequests with some support
for each. In the tax context, we have enough evidence now to believe that bequests and gifts
are somewhat responsive to tax and other economic considerations (Light and McGarry,
2004; Joulfaian and McGarry, 2004; Joulfaian, 2004), but also evidence of signicant inertia
(McGarry, 2000; Poterba, 2001; Brunetti, 2006; Kopczuk, 2007), and do not have a good
handle on a single explanation of behavior.
Part of the problem may be that there is not simply one explanation for behavior of
everyone. Indeed, evidence on the presence of bequest motives points in the direction of
substantial heterogeneity (Laitner and Juster, 1996; Kopczuk and Lupton, 2007). From the
point of view of analyzing optimal policy, this makes for a very disappointing landscape,
because economic models require some form of assumption about the nature of preferences
and there is little consensus about that in the current context. I will argue however below that
9progress can be made by concentrating on taxation applicable to the top of the distribution
alone.
2 Redistribution
Much work has been done to understand the role of estate tax as a part of redistributive
tax system.7 There are two kinds of considerations that come into play. First, as argued
before, there are potential externalities associated with bequests. Second, taxes on transfers
are only a part of the overall tax system.
The presence of interpersonal externalities may seem to be a nuisance that is orthogonal
to redistribution. To some extent it is the case, but it comes naturally with almost all types of
motives and hence is dicult to ignore when one attempts to model it formally. It is also not
completely trivial in terms of how it aects the results because externalities related to giving
are person-specic: their consequences are dierent at dierent places in the income/wealth
distribution and hence taxes to correct them do not take a simple Pigouvian form.8
Yet, as discussed above, interpersonal externalities usually lead to the conclusion that
appears questionable as far as realistic estate taxation is concerned: they call for subsidizing
rather than taxing gifts. Why do I feel that this conclusion is questionable? It is because the
current US transfer taxation is about the wealthy. Subsidizing gifts may well make sense for
much of the public but this kind of externality should go away when we get to the top of the
distribution: the marginal utility of income (or wealth) of both parents and children is low
and hence the relevance of correcting bequest externalities is negligible. Hence, the focus
on bequest motives and their consequences misses the point as far as understanding actual
estate tax is concerned: the precise nature of a bequest motive is relevant only in so far as
its welfare implications are relevant and at the top of the distribution they are not. What is
relevant are revenue implications of taxing bequests, but this is an empirical question rather
than theoretical one.
Estate taxation should be considered in the context of the whole tax system. Here, the
7See Batchelder (2008) for a recent overview of redistributive role of U.S. estate taxation and a proposal
for its modication to improve its redistributional impact. See also Piketty and Saez (2007) for an evaluation
of the contribution of estate taxation to the overall level of progressivity.
8That is not to say that a variant of the principle of targeting does not apply, see Micheletto (2008) for
a general statement and Kopczuk (2001) for an application to estate taxation.
10question is whether estate taxation is necessary when income tax and other instruments
are also available. As elaborated by Kaplow (2001), when externalities are not present, the
logic of the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) theorem applies here: estate tax is a tax on a
particular kind of consumption (bequests), and it is useful only to the extent that observing
this kind of consumption helps in discriminating between high and low ability individuals.
In the special case when bequests do not bring any information about abilities beyond
that contained in labor income alone (technically, when preferences are weakly separable
between labor and other goods), a tax on bequests is undesirable. This logic extends to
the dynamic context analyzed by Farhi and Werning (2008). This is an attractive (even if
preference-dependent) argument: there is a natural special case when income taxation alone
is sucient for redistribution.9
What are the limitations of this argument? It eectively assumes that the sole source
of exogenous dierences between individuals is ability. This is the case in static models
of optimal taxation. It is also the case in dynamic models where multiple generations are
considered, but with the qualication that it may be the whole history and expectations of
abilities for a family that matter. This is what gives labor income its special status: labor
income is the only observable potential tax base that is directly aected by wage rate, other
bases (such as bequests or other goods) reect wage rate only in so far as the price of labor
aects their level through substitutability or complementarity channel.
If there was another source of exogenous dierences between individuals that is reected
in wealth, the special status of being the base that allows for dealing with the exogenous
source of inequality would have to be awarded to wealth as well. What could be that other
source of dierences? Luck is one potential candidate. Entrepreneurial ability is another. In
each case, wealth would reect both this extra attribute and decisions made by an individual,
making it dicult for a social planner to elicit information about the attribute alone and
giving rise to policies that are necessarily distortionary. It seems likely that if one focused
on such a dimension of dierences alone, the logic applying to the top marginal income tax
rates would transfer to this case as well: for a realistic thick-tailed distribution of wealth,
the marginal tax rate on wealth or bequests at the top would be positive (Diamond, 1998;
Saez, 2001). Making this argument formally in a context with both labor market ability and
9This logic has been further pursued by Laroque (2005) and Kaplow (2006a) who show that optimality
of income tax is not necessary for not relying on commodity (including bequests) taxation. Some limitations
to the argument were analyzed by Saez (2002a).
11wealth-generating ability at the same time is bound to be harder, because our knowledge
about solving problems with two dimensions of abilities is still at its infancy, but it would
be an interesting direction to pursue.
I hypothesize that characterizing the marginal tax rates applying at the top of the distri-
bution using approach similar to that pursued by Saez (2001) should be feasible and would
retain conclusions linking the thick tail of the distribution with positive marginal tax rates.
Assume that the welfare weights applying to the very top of the distribution are zero or
converging to zero. Then, any considerations related to externalities are irrelevant. What is
relevant, is the ability of taxes at the top of the distribution to collect revenue. One piece
of the argument relates to thickness of the tails of the wealth and income distributions: how
much wealth or income is there above any given threshold - if it is a lot relative to wealth
around the threshold, then taxing it is desirable. If there is not much, then taxes should
be low or zero. The second piece of the argument would involve desirability of reliance on
labor income vs wealth (or bequest) tax. If labor income and wealth are closely linked,
then the case for taxing wealth is hard as we are back to the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)
logic. However, when wealth and income are driven by (to some extent) dierent exogenous
attributes, that logic would no longer apply and one might expect taxes on both sources
toward the top of the distribution.
In a dynamic context, there is a class of arguments that suggests that capital tax rates
should be zero in the long-run (Judd, 1985; Chamley, 1986). Applied to the estate tax
context, these arguments would suggest that taxing estates is undesirable because it is a
form of a tax on capital. This logic has been challenged when there are market imperfec-
tions such as borrowing constraints (Aiyagari, 1994, 1995) or private information leading to
imperfections in insurance markets (Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski, 2003), although
simulations suggest that the challenge relates to marginal tax rates toward the bottom rather
than the top of the distribution (Albanesi and Sleet, 2005). Without introducing any im-
perfections, Saez (2002b) illustrates that the zero capital taxation result does not preclude
positive marginal tax rates for some individuals (for example, those with wealth above some
high threshold) as long as the long-run level of capital stock is kept ecient by not distorting
saving decisions of the rest. Overall, the argument of Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) is
probably better thought of as indicating that capital stock should be ecient rather than
an argument against any capital taxation in the world with many individuals.
123 Wealth concentration externalities
As is probably evident by now, I nd the state of current economic analysis of estate taxation
unsatisfactory. Focus on bequest motives is misguided when one is concerned with taxes
toward the top of the distribution and, regardless, our knowledge about bequest motives is
patchy at best. While one might think a priori that redistributional arguments could imply
that estate taxation is part of the optimal policy, they have not been seriously developed in
the literature beyond the case when ability is the sole source of dierences between individuals
(in which case, the baseline is no taxation or even subsidies).
The argument for considering estate taxation that I have not discussed yet has to do with
the possibility of externalities from wealth concentration. Before justifying why externalities
from wealth concentration may be of interest, let me briey sketch what one would expect
to happen. Suppose that high wealth concentration has negative eect on welfare of the
society. If this is the case, then the targeting principle would call for a tax hitting wealth
concentration. The current estate tax is precisely that kind of a tax: it aects only those
with high wealth.
Why might one think that wealth concentration has negative economic consequences?
For one thing, some of the world's worst governed countries exhibit high concentration
of wealth. While correlation does not imply causality, it is at least consistent with the
notion that concentration of wealth, i.e. the situation in which some individuals are \big"
relative to the state, has an adverse eect on political process or constitutes a danger to
democracy. This was one of the main arguments used when the estate tax was introduced
in the U.S. (see Joulfaian, 1998, footnote 9 for references). A possible channel has to do
with protecting monopolistic rents: monopolies are a natural source of high wealth and
protecting a monopolistic position is easier when owners can aect the political process.
Another possibility has to do with inability of beneciaries to handle large fortunes: retaining
control of a business within a family often implies transfer of control to children who may not
possess the same entrepreneurial skills as their parents did. The negative social consequences
of inecient management in large rms may then justify an intervention that eectively
prevents such a transfer of control.
Concluding, it should be pointed out that wealth concentration concerns may grow in
importance in the future, although consequences of the current recession for this question
13are still largely unknown. While Scholz (2003), Kopczuk and Saez (2004) and Kennickell
(2006) found that wealth concentration has not been growing much in the past 20 years
despite major increases in concentration of incomes, Edlund and Kopczuk (2009) argue that
this patterns reects simultaneous decline of old wealth and rise of new (entrepreneurial)
one. While in the short-term the trends may be osetting, one would expect that increased
concentration of income will eventually lead to increased concentration of wealth.
4 Empirical evidence related to estate taxation
So far, I concentrated on understanding the arguments that could, in theory, be made for or
against estate taxation. The main conclusion is that our current state of knowledge does not
allow for characterizing the full optimal estate tax schedule. However, it appears plausible
that a more limited question regarding the size of the optimal tax rates at the top of the
distribution can in principle be at least partially answered (although has not been yet).
If one subscribes to the view that there are important negative externalities from wealth
concentration, some estimate of their relevance is necessary and I am not aware of studies
that would help here. However, I believe that we now have most of the piece of information
that would allow for answering the purely redistributive question. The required components
involve information about the distribution of income and wealth as well as the strength of
behavioral responses to taxation. Reviewing evidence on the impact of transfer taxes on
behavior is the topic that I turn to next.
Perhaps the most obvious question to ask is how estate taxation aects the overall size
of estates. While straightforward to ask, it is extremely dicult to answer. The main
conceptual diculty has to do with the fact that one is interested in the eect on the stock
of wealth and that eect accumulates over many years (and in practice many tax regimes).
As a result, it is very dicult to come up with a convincing design that would allow for
establishing a causal link between tax rates and estates. Nevertheless, some attempts have
been made to answer this question. Holtz-Eakin and Marples (2001) exploit cross-sectional
variation in state estate and inheritance taxes, Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001) rely on multiple
tax reforms and age variation to proxy for tax rates applicable over the lifetime and Joulfaian
(2006) uses aggregate time-series evidence. All three papers reach fairly similar conclusion
of modest elasticity of the the order of between 0.1 and 0.2 (i.e., a one percent increase
14in the marginal tax rate reduces estates by between 0.1 and 0.2 percent). Similarity of
the conclusions is interesting given important dierences in interpretation of the results in
dierent studies. Holtz-Eakin and Marples (2001) use survey data and therefore are close
to estimating the eect on the actual wealth. Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001) and Joulfaian
(2006) rely on estate tax data and therefore estimate the eect on reported gross estates.
Hence, similarity in the results may suggest that the estimated responses reect the impact
on wealth accumulation rather than avoidance. For some questions, this distinction does
not matter - for example, Feldstein (1999) argued that the anatomy of behavioral response
does not matter for evaluating the excess burden of taxation because any source of response
has the underlying cost that's on the margin equal to the potential tax saving (marginal
tax rate). However, if one is interested in understanding the eect of estate tax on wealth
accumulation, the distinction becomes crucial. Trying to dismiss the importance of avoidance
based on these studies is however heroic due to the number of other dierences between them.
By focusing on tax rates at the time of death, Holtz-Eakin and Marples (2001) and Joulfaian
(2006) identify the mix of the response shortly before death and (to the extent that taxes
at death are correlated with expected tax rates earlier in life) a longer term accumulation
response. The preferred specication of Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001), on the other hand,
corresponds to the long-term eect alone. Furthermore, Holtz-Eakin and Marples (2001) are
identied o the responsiveness at relatively low levels of wealth (below federal threshold but
above state ones), while other studies focus squarely on estate tax paying population. My
interpretation of this evidence is that some wealth accumulation response is likely present
but it is unlikely to be large.
The extent of estate tax avoidance is hard to assess. It has been long suggested that
avoiding the estate tax is easy (Cooper, 1979), but this is a controversial topic. For example,
Schmalbeck (2001) argues that most of tax avoidance strategies require relinquishing control
over assets and that it is something that most taxpayers are reluctant to do. Aggregate
studies attempting to estimate the extent of estate tax avoidance by comparing wealth
holdings with estates that show up on tax returns turn out be sensitive to assumptions
regarding mortality rates and inconclusive as a result (Wol, 1996; Poterba, 2000; Eller,
Erard, and Ho, 2001). Audit-based studies estimate the extent of tax avoidance at between
8 to 13% of overall tax liability (Eller and Johnson, 1999; Erard, 1999), but they are not
identifying legal or unchallenged types of responses. Particular types of avoidance strategies
have been given closer attention. For example, Johnson, Mikow, and Eller (2001) found
15that approximately 6% of returns claimed minority or lack-of-marketability discounts and
that their average size was about 10% of gross estate (for those who claimed the discounts).
Poterba and Weisbenner (2003) pursue this direction further.
A strand of the literature focused on responsiveness of inter vivos gifts to tax consider-
ations. This is of particular interest both because the simplest avoidance strategies work
through exploiting dierential tax treatment of estates and gifts, and because freezing the
value of estate is one of the basic avoidance strategies and is likely to require pursuing tax-
able gifts. It has been documented that signicant number of taxpayers does not pursue the
simplest strategy of taking advantage of annual gift exemption (McGarry, 1999; Poterba,
2001; Joulfaian and McGarry, 2004). At the same time, it has also been documented that
taxable gifts are in fact responsive to tax considerations (Bernheim, Lemke, and Scholz,
2004; Joulfaian, 2004; Joulfaian and McGarry, 2004). The two are not necessarily inconsis-
tent for two reasons. First, studies that nd insucient giving are based on survey data
and hence population with relatively modest (among estate taxpayers) wealth, while taxable
gifts studies correspond to much wealthier population. Second, it is possible that there is
substantial heterogeneity in behavior even among similar taxpayers driven by heterogeneity
of the presence of a bequest motive.
Kopczuk (2007) presents a richer picture of tax avoidance by focusing on behavior fol-
lowing the onset of terminal illness. I nd that there are large adjustments to the size and
structure of estates that occur in the last months of life and provide evidence that these
adjustments reect tax avoidance. This indicates that planning prior to the onset of termi-
nal illness was not sucient and provides support for the notion that there are important
barriers to tax avoidance, perhaps related to undesirability of giving up control over assets
(Schmalbeck, 2001). I also nd that estates are growing with age even among the very
elderly, further underscoring that avoidance is not always pursued in advance.
Overall, work on estate tax avoidance does not paint a precise picture of behavior but
rather suggests important heterogeneity among otherwise similar taxpayers, dierent wealth
groups and stages of life. 10
10A number of other estate tax related issues have been analyzed in the literature. Joulfaian (2005)
provides a recent review of the literature on charitable bequests, Brunetti (2006) nds suggestive evidence of
the impact of estate tax on survival of family businesses and Kopczuk and Slemrod (2003) nd that estate
tax changes appear to aect reported date of death within days of the reform.
165 Conclusions
In this paper, I attempted to review economics arguments related to estate taxation. My rst
point was negative: despite large body of work on bequest motives, we have little consensus
regarding reasons that people have for leaving bequests. As a result, we do not have any
compelling theoretical conclusions regarding taxation of gifts and estates: any such theory
requires taking a stand on the nature of a bequest motive.
On a more positive note, I argued that understanding the precise nature of a bequest
motive is irrelevant for establishing the appropriate tax rates at the top of the distribution.
In general, the bequest motive matters for two reasons: because of its welfare implications
and because it determines responsiveness of estates to tax rates. The rst of these is close to
irrelevant in the standard welfarist framework when one concentrates on the wealthy with
low marginal utility of income and wealth. The second of these considerations is ultimately
an empirical question that cannot be settled by theory. The empirical question can be
addressed without taking a position on the nature of a bequest motive. I also hypothesized
that the optimal estate tax rates at the top of the distribution are likely to be positive but
precisely stating this point is an open issue.
I considered optimal taxation arguments for taxing estates and concluded that arguments
having to do with redistribution for welfarist reasons are not strong. On the other hand,
if there are negative externalities from wealth concentration then estate taxation could be
part of the optimal tax structure. Determining whether such externalities exist is an ongoing
research issue.
I briey reviewed empirical evidence about the eect of estate tax on behavior. While the
state of this literature does not allow for reaching denitive conclusions, it appears likely that
both wealth accumulation and avoidance are responsive to tax considerations with neither of
these eects being very large, but the bulk of response working along avoidance margin. The
fact that avoidance does not appear to be very tax-sensitive does not imply that avoidance
of estate tax overall is not a signicant issue, because it only reects the response on the
margin starting from the situation where the marginal tax rates are already high and perhaps
avoidance is already signicant. The two exceptions where signicant responses were found
involve large taxable gifts and behavior shortly before death.
If indeed wealth accumulation is not too responsive to tax incentives, then arguments
17related to undesirability of capital taxation do not apply in this context. Furthermore,
theoretical work that suggests desirability of zero capital taxation calls for eciency of the
overall capital stock that does not imply that all individuals face zero marginal tax rates on
their estates.
Finally, in a number of places I signalled potential heterogeneity in behavior. There
is work documenting heterogeneity in wealth accumulation (Charles and Hurst, 2003) and
bequest motives (Kopczuk and Lupton, 2007). Studies documenting insucient inter vivos
giving (McGarry, 1999; Poterba, 2001) point out to heterogeneity in how this strategy is
pursued and can be reconciled with responsiveness of taxable gifts only in the presence of
substantial variation in behavior among estate taxpayers. Furthermore, there appears to be
ex post variation in the extent of tax avoidance pursued during life depending on whether
death was preceded by a lengthy illness (Kopczuk, 2007). As a result, empirical evidence on
estate taxation is likely to appear conicting and controversial because dierent studies and
strategies might eectively focus on dierent subsets of population.
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